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This working paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Enterprise 
and Innovation. Abstract 
This  chapter  addresses  the  changing  nature  of  corporate  governance  in  the 
United Kingdom over recent decades and examines whether these changes have 
had  an  impact  on  the  UK  market  for  corporate  control.  The  disappointing 
outcomes  for  acquiring  company  shareholders  in  the  majority  of  corporate 
acquisitions, public discontent with some pay deals for top executives and some 
high profile corporate scandals led in the early 1990s to a call for governance 
reform. The scrutiny of governance in UK companies has intensified since the 
publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992 and has resulted in calls for changes 
in  the  size,  composition  and  role  of  boards  of  directors,  in  the  role  of 
institutional shareholders, the remuneration and appointment of executives, and 
in legal and accounting regulations. We review the background to these changes 
and  the  consequences  of  the  changes  since  1990  for  governance  structures. 
Finally, we examine whether these changes have affected takeover performance 
in recent years. Our analysis is specific to the institutional circumstances of the 
UK although we refer where appropriate to takeover studies in other countries. 
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following address: www.cbr.cam.ac.uk.   1 
UK Corporate Governance and Takeover Performance 
 
Merger Outcomes and Managerialism 
 
In their seminal book on the emerging modern corporation Berle and Means 
demonstrated  the  growing  separation  of  ownership  from  control  with  an 
increasing dispersion of shareholdings along with an increasing concentration of 
economic  power.  Taken  together  these  forces  required  us  to  question  the 
assumption that firms would be run in the interests of their shareholders since 
product market competition was inadequate to limit management discretion, and 
dispersed shareholdings limited cohesive shareholder control (Berle and Means, 
1932).  
 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s various authors developed alternative theories 
of the firm taking account of the separation of ownership from control. These 
models found their most developed form in the Marris model of managerial 
capitalism (Marris, 1964). This steady-state growth model explored posited a 
trade-off  between  profit  and  growth  maximisation  and  explored  alternative 
growth  strategies  for  the  firm,  balancing  the  growth  of  demand  with  the 
financing of growth, and with higher growth of demand being achieved through 
diversification.  This  model  gave  a  central  role  to  takeovers  as  the  ultimate 
constraint  on  excessive  growth  ambitions  by  managers  as  shareholder 
dissatisfaction  would  lead  to  falling  share  prices  and  the  emergence  of 
underpriced  companies  ripe  for  takeover.  This  aspect  of  Marris’  work  was 
echoed by Manne (1965) in his eloquent exposition of the market for corporate 
control. 
 
In an important development Mueller (1969) recognised the dual role played by 
merger  activity  in  a  managerial  world.  Whilst  acquisitions  might  be  the 
principal  method  through  which  the  abuse  of  managerial  control  might  be 
limited,  they  also  provided  the  mechanism  by  which  managerial  growth 
ambitions could be met and that this was most likely to be found in the case of 
the conglomerate merger. 
  
‘The management intent upon maximising growth will tend to ignore, or at least 
heavily discount, investment opportunities outside the firm, since these will not 
contribute  to  the  internal  expansion  of  the  firm.  ….  A  growth-maximising 
management  will  then  be  assumed  to  calculate  the  present  value  of  an 
investment opportunity using a lower discount rate than a stock-holder-welfare-
maximiser would. As before, this will result in greater investment and lower 
dividends for the growth maximiser.’ (Mueller, 1969, pp. 647-648). This line of   2 
argument clearly anticipated and is essentially the same as in the free cash flow 
theory of takeovers (Jensen, 1986) that explained why takeover outcomes were 
disappointing, particularly when they involved diversification.  
 
These developments in the theory of the firm spawned a large number of studies 
examining the outcomes of merger activity in the period up to the early 1980s. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to review this early evidence in depth since 
that has been done elsewhere (e.g., Mueller, 1980; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; 
Maggenheim and Mueller, 1988; Hughes, 1993, Gugler et al., 2002; Tuch and 
O’Sullivan,  2007).  Instead,  we  will  highlight  some  of  the  key  points, 
particularly in relation to UK studies.  
 
The  first  UK  study  of  takeovers  to  formally  address  the  implications  for 
takeovers of managerial models of the firm was by Singh (1971). This study 
particularly focused on the natural selection role for the market for corporate 
control by examining the characteristics of the acquirer and the acquired. The 
findings cast some doubt on the workings of the market for corporate control 
and gave support to managerial models. 
 
‘To sum up, the take-over mechanism on the stock market, although it provides 
a measure of discipline for small firms with below average profitability, does 
not seem to meet the motivational requirements of the orthodox theory of the 
firm as far as the large firms are concerned. The evidence suggests that these 
firms are not compelled to maximise or to vigorously pursue profits in order to 
reduce the danger of takeover, since they can in principle achieve this object by 
becoming bigger without increasing the rate of profit. … The results of this 
study  suggest  that  the  fear  of  takeover,  rather  than  being  a  constraint  on 
managerial discretion, may also encourage them in the same direction.’ 
 
Whilst Singh did examine the performance of the firm post-takeover, this aspect 
was modestly explored in comparison with the mass of studies that followed. 
Merger activity since the period analysed by Singh is shown in Figure 1. Early 
studies of these years for the UK examined accounting measures as a means of 
judging  merger  success  (e.g.,  Meeks,  1977;  and  Cosh  et  al.,  1980).  These 
studies  examined  the  performance  of  the  acquirer  post-merger  with  the 
weighted average performance of the acquirer and the acquired before the event. 
This requires a counterfactual assumption about how the acquirer and acquired 
would  have  performed  in  the  post-merger  period  had  they  remained 
independent. This assumption could be drawn from the average performance of 
the industry, but this does not allow for individual firm characteristics, so it is 
more common today to use a control group of firms matched to the event firms   3 
by certain criteria.  Despite the fact that accounting  measures are  capable of 
being manipulated in ways that distort the true picture and that a variety of 
alternative  counterfactual  assumptions  can  be  made  about  what  would  have 
happened in the absence of merger, the findings of studies of UK takeovers up 
to and including the 1980s (e.g., Cosh et al., 1989; and Dickerson et al., 1997) 
generally supported the view that profitability did not improve and generally 
fell following a takeover. 
 
Figure 1 Merger Activity in the United Kingdom 1969-2006 
Figure 1A  Number of domestic and overseas acquisitions































Figure 1B  Value of domestic and overseas acquisitions
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Accounting studies were rapidly submerged by a flood of mainly US studies 
based on share prices, initially of their behaviour surrounding the announcement 
of  the  takeover,  but  subsequently  over  an  extended  event  window  of  a  few 
years.  These  event  studies  face  the  same  sort  of  problems  in  tackling  the 
counterfactual and the sophistication of the methods has increased substantially 
in recent years (e.g., Jaffe, 1974; Mandelker, 1974; Brown and Warner, 1985; 
Barber and Lyon, 1997; Fama, 1998; and Lyon et al., 1999). Apart form some 
early studies (Asquith et al., 1983; and Franks and Harris, 1989), the findings 
concerning  announcement  returns  for  both  the  UK  and  the  US  are  fairly 
consistent in showing insignificant, or negative returns to acquirer shareholders 
and positive gains to the shareholders of the acquired. The picture becomes 
even more bleak if we extend the event window to a few years following the 
acquisition.  UK  studies  (e.g.,  Limmack,  1991;  and  Gregory,  1997)  provided 
convincing  evidence  of  significantly  negative  returns  on  average  over  this 
period for acquirer shareholders. 
 
In summary, the evidence available at the time of the Cadbury Report in 1992 
and its successors was that the selection mechanism in the market for corporate 
control  was  highly  imperfect;  and  that  takeovers  were  not  returning 
performance  gains  either  in  terms  of  profitability,  or  for  their  shareholders. 
Therefore,  the  conclusion  of  this  brief  review  is  that  we  are  faced  with  a 
dilemma. The failure of owners to directly monitor and control managers in 
order to ensure that value-maximising decisions are taken led to a reliance on 
the  market  for  corporate  control  to  discipline  management.  However,  the 
evidence briefly reviewed above suggests that: 
 
•  the market for corporate control is an imperfect disciplinarian; and  
•  an  active  takeover  market  provides  the  means  for  greater  non-value-
maximising  behaviour  by  management,  particularly  amongst  the  largest 
companies. 
 
In other words, rather than providing a check on managerial discretion, the 
market  for  corporate  control  was  a  means  of  exploiting  it.  In  these 
circumstances the emphasis turns back on shareholders to develop governance 
mechanisms  to  elect  boards  of  directors  and  design  monitor  and  enforce 
incentives for management as the means of ensuring that companies are run in 
their interests. 
   5 
The Regulation of Corporate Governance 
 
The concerns about the apparent failure of corporate acquisitions to deliver the 
promised returns to shareholders were heightened by high profile cases of high 
rewards to top management that were not associated with exceptional corporate 
performance.  These  were  reinforced  by  a  series  of  corporate  collapses  and 
scandals in the 1980s and 1990s in the UK and abroad and this meant that 
corporate governance came under increasing scrutiny. The principal concerns 
were  about  the  effectiveness  of  the  board  of  directors  as  guardians  of  the 
shareholders’ interests and the transparency of company accounts and reports. 
The City of London has a long history of self-regulation and so the first move 
took the form of the Cadbury Committee set up in May 1991 by the Financial 
Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession 
to address the financial aspects of corporate governance.  
 
‘Its sponsors were concerned at the perceived low level of confidence both in 
financial reporting and in the ability of auditors to provide the safeguards which 
the users of company reports sought and expected. The underlying factors were 
seen as the looseness of accounting standards, the absence of a clear framework 
for ensuring that directors kept under review the controls in their business, and 
competitive  pressures  both  on  companies  and  on  auditors  which  made  it 
difficult for auditors to stand up to demanding boards.’ (Cadbury, 1992, 2.1) 
 
The  distinguished  Committee  established  the  principles  that  have  been 
reinforced and securely established in the years since it was published. The 
governing principles are transparency in reporting and a code of practice based 
on  ‘comply  or  explain’  rather  than  legislation.  The  report  concerned  the 
effective operation of the board of directors, the separation of the roles of chief 
executive and Chairman, the role of non-executives, board committees and the 
audit process. At the heart of the Committee’s recommendations was a Code of 
Best  Practice  designed  to  achieve  the  necessary  high  standards  of  corporate 
governance  behaviour.  The  London  Stock  Exchange  required  all  listed 
companies  registered  in  the  United  Kingdom,  as  a  continuing  obligation  of 
listing, to state whether they were complying with the Code and to give reasons 
for any areas of non-compliance. 
 
The  recommendations  of  the  Cadbury  Committee  have  been  refined  and 
augmented in the intervening years. Continuing concerns about top executive 
remuneration led to the establishment in 1995 of the Greenbury Committee on 
the  initiative  of  the  CBI.  Its  purpose  was  ‘to  identify  good  practice  in 
determining Directors’ remuneration and prepare a Code of such practice’. It   6 
recommended that pay structures should be set to align the interests of directors 
and shareholders, reinforced the independence of remuneration committees and 
introduced  significant  reporting  requirements.  The  guidelines  have  been 
reinforced  subsequently  by  reports  from  the  Association  of  British  Insurers 
(2006) and others. 
 
The  Financial  Reporting  Council  in  turn  set  up  the  Hampel  Committee  to 
review the findings and outcomes from the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports 
(Greenbury (1995), Hampel (1997)). The result was the Combined Code on 
Corporate  Governance  published  in  1998.  In  response  to  this  Code,  the 
accounting  body,  the  ICAEW,  commissioned  the  Turnbull  Report  that 
examined internal control capabilities and mechanisms (and the guidance that 
emerged  was  later  revised  in  2005).  Following  the  Enron  and  WorldCom 
scandals, the Higgs Report of 2003 led to the updating of the Combined Code. 
Soft  regulation  and  shareholder  performance  remained  at  the  heart  of  the 
reforms. 
 
‘The  Combined  Code  and  its  philosophy  of  ‘comply  or  explain’  is  being 
increasingly  emulated  outside  the  UK.  It  offers  flexibility  and  intelligent 
discretion and allows for the valid exception to the sound rule. The brittleness 
and rigidity of legislation cannot dictate the behaviour, or foster the trust, I 
believe is fundamental to the effective unitary board and to superior corporate 
performance. ‘ (Higgs, 2003, p. 3) 
 
‘Whereas  in  the  US  most  governance  discussion  has  focused  on  corporate 
malpractice, in the UK sharp loss of shareholder value is more common than 
fraud or corporate collapse. The fall in stockmarkets in the period 2000-2002 
has  thrown  up  some  stark  examples.  In  recent  cases  of  corporate  under-
performance in the UK, the role of the board and of non-executive directors in 
particular, has understandably been called into question.’ (Higgs, 2003, p. 16) 
 
The  revised  Code  ‘aimed  principally  to  advance  and  reflect  best  practice 
through revisions to the code’ and ‘to focus on the behaviours and relationships, 
and the need for the best people, which are essential for an effective board’. To 
this  end  it  gave  increased  attention  to  non-executive  directors  and  their 
recruitment, role and independence.  
 
Throughout this fifteen-year period of development and refinement of the Code 
the role of institutional shareholders has been tackled quite modestly in each of 
the reports. Cadbury and the subsequent reports and versions of the Code have 
made  few  meaningful  suggestions  in  this  area  –  mainly  consisting  of   7 
improvements to consultation and information flow. This may be in part due to 
the orientation of the Code towards aspects of corporate behaviour it is able to 
directly influence, but it is also due to the requirement to treat all shareholders 
equally. This ‘equity’ requirement has left these shareholders, who collectively 
hold over half the shares, with an often indirect influence and involvement with 
the company. On the other hand there is some evidence that the monitoring role 
of  institutional  investors  in  relation  to  the  implementation  of  the  Code  has 
increased  between  the  publication  of  the  first  guidelines  by  the  Institutional 
Shareholders’ Committee in 1991 and their revisions ISC (2007). 
 
The current version of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (FRC, 
2006) has the following main provisions. 
 
The Role and Composition of the Board 
 
•  A single board of appropriate size with members collectively responsible for 
leading  the  company  and  setting  its  values  and  standards  and  taking 
decisions in the interests of the company. 
•  A clear division of responsibilities for running the board and running the 
company with a separate chairman and chief executive. 
•  A balance of executive and independent non-executive directors - for larger 
companies at least 50% of the board members should be independent non-
executive directors; smaller companies should have at least two independent 
directors. 
•  Formal, rigorous and transparent procedures for appointing directors, with 
all appointments and re-appointments to be ratified by shareholders. 




•  Formal  and  transparent  procedures  for  setting  executive  remuneration, 
including a remuneration committee made up of independent directors and a 
vote for shareholders on new long-term incentive schemes. 
•  Levels of remuneration sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of 
quality.  
•  A significant proportion of remuneration to be linked to performance. 
 
   8 
Accountability and Audit 
 
•  The  board  is  responsible  for  presenting  a  balanced  assessment  of  the 
company's  position  (including  through  the  accounts),  and  maintaining  a 
sound system of internal control. 
•  Formal  and  transparent  procedures  for  carrying  out  these  responsibilities, 
including an audit committee made up of independent directors and with the 
necessary experience. 
 
Relations with Shareholders 
 
•  The  board  must  maintain  contact  with  shareholders  to  understand  their 
opinions and concerns. 
•  Separate resolutions on all substantial issues at general meetings. 
 
The  2006  Code  also  imposes  obligations  on  Institutional  Shareholders  as 
follows: 
 
•  Institutional shareholders should enter into a dialogue with companies. 
•  Institutional shareholders have a responsibility to make a considered use of 
their votes. 
 
The key questions are whether companies have responded to these changing 
requirements demanded by successive Codes and, more importantly, has this 
brought the greater alignment of performance with shareholder interests that 
was sought. 
 
The Impact on Governance 
 
The first question to be tackled is whether fifteen years of soft regulation has 
brought significant changes in corporate governance practice and structure in 
the UK. We will address this question by examining in turn: the role of non-
executive directors; the separation of the roles of chief executive and chairman; 





There is overwhelming evidence that the proportion of non-executive directors 
has increased substantially in the UK in the past two decades. Table 1 shows for 
a  sample  of  the  largest  UK  companies  that  the  proportion  of  non-executive   9 
directors on the board rose from an average of about one-third in 1980/81 to 
one-half in 1995/96. By 2006, non-executive directors accounted for 60% of the 
board on average in the top 100 UK listed companies. Guest (2007b) shows for 
a much larger sample of UK listed firms that it is not only amongst the largest 
that this has occurred. Figure 2 shows that much the same process has been 
under way for the largest fifteen hundred companies, with the proportion of 
non-executives  rising  from  35%  in  the  early  1980s  to  55%  in  2002  –  a 
remarkably  similar  level  as  well  as  pattern  to  that  found  for  the  largest 
companies. Whilst this growth of the proportion of non-executive towards the 
typical  proportion  found  in  US  companies  (Cosh  and  Hughes,  1987)  is 
undoubtedly  associated  with  the  reforms  discussed  in  the  previous  section, 
Figure 2 shows that the change was already happening prior to the Cadbury 
Report. 
 
Another feature of changes in board structure is the decline in the average board 
size shown for the largest companies in Table 1. This finding is supported for 
the  larger  sample  that  includes  companies  from  across  a  wider  size  range. 
Figure 2 shows that this decline started in the late 1980s and is more directly 
associated with the intense debate about the appropriate size and composition of 
boards  engendered  by  the  various  reports.  It  would  appear  that  somewhat 
smaller boards could be viewed as more cohesive and effective. An alternative 
view  is  that  the  shortage  of  top  quality  candidates  for  non-executive 
directorships has forced board size decline as a means of raising the proportion 
of non-executive directors. 
   10 
Figure 2 Trends in Board Structure: 1981-2002 
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1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Data available in 1981 
Data available in 1983 
Data available in 1985 
Data available in 1987 
All observations 
 
Figs. 2A and 2B report the trends in average board size and the proportion of outsiders respectively for UK 
firms during 1981-2002. The bold line in each figure incorporates all firm year observations. For Fig. 2B this is 
estimated from 1988 onwards only because of changing sample composition prior to this date. For this figure 
earlier trends are exhibited by the fainter lines which represent samples available in earlier years (1981, 1983, 
1985 and 1987) for which new firms are not added in subsequent years. 
   Source: Guest (2007b). 
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Table 1 Board Size and Composition 1980-2006 (Large UK Companies) 
 
  1980/81  1995/96  2005/06 
All Directors  14  13  11 
Executive Directors  9  6  5 
Non-executive Directors  5  6  6 
Proportion of Non-
executives  0.36  0.50  0.60 
 




In  some  writings  the  terms  ‘non-executive  directors’  and  ‘independent 
directors’ are used interchangeably, but this is not necessarily the case. Table 2 
examines  the  background  of  non-executive  directors  amongst  giant  UK 
companies  in  1981  and  1996.  It  shows  that  over  half  of  the  non-executive 
directors of these companies are current, or former, executive directors of the 
company, or of other similar companies; and there is no sign of any change in 
this proportion in the 1980s and 1990s. Table 3 examines the other directorships 
held by various types of directors and reinforces the picture of inter-locking 
directorships. Current executive directors typically hold one other directorship 
within the Times 1000 companies, but non-executives hold more. Overall, there 
is a decline in the number of these outside directorships held between 1981 and 
1996. This may have declined further since that time. Higgs (2003) reports that 
of the 3,908 non-executive directors of UK listed companies in 2002, 80% hold 
only  one  directorship  and  only  7%  hold  both  executive  and  non-executive 
directorships in UK listed companies. One would expect a higher proportion of 
the  latter  amongst  the  largest  companies,  but  the  decline  in  inter-locking 
directorships does appear to have continued over the period 1996-2002. 
   12 
Table 2 Independence of Non-executive Directors (Percentage Distribution - 
Giant UK Companies) 
 
  1981  1996 
Past CEO / executive director of this 
company 
15  10 
CEO / executive director of other Times 1000  26  28 
Former CEO / executive director of Times 
1000 
10  14 
Executive Director of other non-financial 
company 
4  3 
Executive Director of financial company  20  13 
Former civil servant or politician  12  12 
Overseas  6  14 
Other  7  6 
  100%  100% 
     
% 'Insider' non-executives (first four rows)  55%  55% 
  
Source: Cosh and Hughes (1997a). 
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Table 3 Number of Outside Directorships (Median Numbers - Giant UK 
Companies) 
 
  1981  1996 
Executive     
CEO chair  2.3  1.2 
CEO not Chair  0.9  1.1 
Other executive chair  4.8  2 
Other executive  0.6  0.5 
     
Non-executive     
Past CEO / executive director of this 
company 
2.7  2.6 
CEO / executive director of other Times 1000  3.3  2.1 
Former CEO / executive director of Times 
1000 
4.2  2.9 
Executive Director of other non-financial 
company 
3.9  2.2 
Executive Director of financial company  4.1  2.2 
Other  2.4  2.4 
     
Summary     
All CEO  1.9  1.2 
All executive directors  0.9  0.6 
All non-executive directors  3.3  2.4 
  
Source: Cosh and Hughes (1997a). 
 
   14 
The above concerns resulted in great emphasis being placed on the importance 
of the independence of non-executive directors in the Higgs Report published in 
2003.  It  identified  the  circumstances  in  which  a  non-executive  director’s 
independence would be called into question; specifically, where the director: 
 
•  is  a  former  employee  of  the  company  or  group  until  five  years  after 
employment (or any other material connection) has ended; 
•  has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship 
with the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or 
senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company; 
•  has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart 
from  a  director’s  fee,  participates  in  the  company’s  share  option  or  a 
performance-related pay scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension 
scheme; 
•  has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior 
employees; 
•  holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through 
involvement in other companies or bodies; 
•  represents a significant shareholder; or 
•  has served on the board for more than ten years. 
 
It  is  too  early  to  assess  the  impact  of  these  new  recommendations  on  the 
independence of non-executive directors in UK companies. 
 
Separation of the CEO and Chairman 
 
A key element of the corporate governance reforms within in the UK from the 
Cadbury Report onwards has been the separation of the roles of chief executive 
and chairman. 
 
‘Given the importance and particular nature of the chairman’s role, it should in 
principle  be  separate  from  that  of  the  chief  executive.  If  the  two  roles  are 
combined in one person, it represents a considerable concentration of power. 
We recommend, therefore, that there should be a clearly accepted division of 
responsibilities at the head of a company, which will ensure a balance of power 
and authority, such that no one individual has unfettered powers of decision. 
Where the chairman is also the chief executive, it is essential that there should 
be a strong and independent element on the board.’ (Cadbury, 1992) 
   15 
There can be little doubt that here too the governance reforms in the UK have 
had an impact. Cosh and Hughes (1997a) show that, for a sample of the largest 
UK companies, the proportion of firms combining these roles fell from 74% in 
1981 to 50% in 1996. Conyon and Peck (1998a) examine the FT top 100 UK 
listed companies and find that the proportion with the combined role of chief 
executive and chairman fell from 52% in 1991 to 36% in 1994. They also show 
that the proportion with a remuneration committee rose from 78% to 99%, and 
those  with  a  nomination  committee  rose  from  12%  to  72%,  over  the  same 
period.  These  findings  suggest  an  instant  structural  impact  of  the  Cadbury 
proposals  in  these  areas.  Today  almost  all  large  UK  listed  companies  have 




The  Combined  Code  on  Corporate  Governance  recommends  that  executive 
remuneration should be at a level sufficient to attract and retain executive talent 
and  that  a  significant  proportion  should  be  directly  related  to  corporate 
performance. It also seeks transparency in the reporting of executive pay to 
shareholders  and,  as  a  consequence,  UK  company  reports  today  generally 
contain  lengthy  and  detailed  reports  from  the  Remuneration  Committee. 
However,  these  still  fail  to  give  a  simple  overall  picture  of  the  total 
remuneration package and its composition. In addition, it is perhaps ironic that 
public concern about the level of top executive pay that led to these reforms has 
not  resulted  in  lower  levels  of  executive  pay  on  average.  In  fact,  quite  the 
opposite has occurred. Cosh and Hughes (1997a) show that the median level of 
CEO  remuneration  rose  from  £222,000  in  1981  to  £827,000  in  1996  for  a 
sample of large UK companies (in 2006 prices). The bonus element of this pay 
rose from a negligible proportion to 21% by 1996. Amongst the top 100 UK 
listed  companies  in  2006,  the  median  level  of  CEO  remuneration  was 
£1,017,000 and the bonus element had risen to over 35% of this part of the 
remuneration package. This rise in executive pay levels, particularly in the past 
decade,  has  been  reinforced  by  the  award  of  stock  option  and  long-term 
incentive plans that were rare in the early 1980s (Cosh and Hughes, 1987, 1997; 
and  Main  et  al.,  1996).  By  2006  the  inclusion  of  these  elements  raises  the 
average  pay  package  of  CEOs  of  FTSE  100  companies  to  £3.3m  and  the 
performance related element of the whole package has increased to about 80% 
(Financial Times, 15 May 2006). Despite this rise in the level and structure of 
top executive pay, the debate continues to rage about whether it has had the 
intended effects in terms of performance (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; and 
Kay and Putten, 2007). 
   16 
Institutional Shareholdings 
 
The rising dominance of financial institutions as holders of UK listed company 
shares  is  well  documented.  Figure  3  shows  that  the  proportion  of  ordinary 
shares held by financial institutions more than doubled from 30% in 1963 to 
62%  in  1993.  The  figure  also  shows  that  overseas  holdings  have  risen 
dramatically from 4% in 1981 to 40% in 2006. Most of these holdings appear to 
be with overseas financial institutions and so it is reasonable to allocate the 
overseas holdings across the other categories in the proportions they are found 
for  domestic  holdings.  If  overseas  holdings  are  allocated  in  this  way,  the 
holdings of financial institutions have risen from about 30% in 1963 to above 
70% since 1990s. 
 
 













1963 1969 1975 1981 1989 1993 1999 2006
Rest of world Financial institutions Individuals Other
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This picture of rising dominance is calculated by summing all the holdings of 
financial institutions, but this may give a false picture if the holdings are so 
dispersed that effective action is prevented. This is not the case. In a random 
sample of fifty of the FTSE 100 companies we found that the median number of 
holdings above 3% of the voting stock was 3 and that the median % of the stock 
held by such holdings was 17.9% (the mean figures were 3.5 holdings with 
21.8%). These holdings are in general dominated by the holdings of financial 
institutions,  about  half  of  which  are  foreign.  This  suggests  a  much  greater 
dominance  by  institutional  holders  than  that  reported  by  Cosh  and  Hughes 
(1997a) for 1981 and 1996. It would appear that this type of holder clearly has 
the ability to directly influence management behaviour. 
 
In  conclusion,  we  can  see  that  there  have  been  many  changes  to  these  key 
structural aspects of corporate governance over the last two decades, at least 
partly  in  response  to  the  evolving  Code.  The  question  remains  whether  this 
closer tie of executive pay to performance and the supposed greater scrutiny of 
their  decisions  by  the  board  of  directors  have  led  to  changed  takeover 
behaviour. It is apparent from Figure 1 that despite all of these changes there 
has been no abatement in takeover activity. In fact, it has grown in scale and 
become more international in nature. In recent years the UK market has seen the 
rise in importance of private equity transactions. 
 
“Our inquiry was undertaken in response to the growing significance of the 
private  equity  industry  in  the  UK,  and  particularly  the  rising  number  of 
takeovers of very large companies by private equity firms. These are a new 
phenomenon; the recent £11 billion purchase of Alliance Boots was the first 
takeover of a FTSE 100 company by a private equity firm. The increasing size 
of  private  equity  deals  raises  a  range  of  issues,  relating  for  example  to  the 
impact of private equity on jobs, pensions, financial stability, transparency and 
accountability and tax revenues…. Currently 8% of the UK’s workforce (1.2 
million workers) is employed in private equity owned companies and 19% work 
in  companies  which  have  at  some  stage  been  in  private  equity  ownership.” 
(Treasury Select Committee, 2007) 
 
This phenomenon is beyond the scope of this review, but we do speculate below 
whether it has introduced something new into the market for corporate control. 
We  now  turn  to  examine  whether  we  can  observe  an  improved  takeover 
performance in recent years.   18 
UK Takeover Performance since the 1980s 
 
Have  these  corporate  governance  changes  been  associated  with  better 
acquisition performance? There are different ways of addressing this question. 
We can examine the apparent impact on performance of individual aspects of 
corporate  governance.  We  do  this  below  but,  first,  in  this  section  we  ask 
whether the large and pervasive changes in corporate governance have been 
associated with overall improvements in acquisition performance. A number of 
UK studies have examined the performance of takeovers since 1980 in terms of 
both shareholder returns and accounting profitability.  
 
These studies have shown that share returns at announcement are negative for 
acquirer  shareholders.  For  example,  Cosh  et  al.  (2006)  for  a  sample  of  363 
acquirers (between 1985 and 1996) acquiring UK listed targets find that the 
mean  announcement  abnormal  return  is  -1.13  percent,  which  is  statistically 
significant.  Therefore,  over  the  three  days  surrounding  the  acquisition 
announcement,  the  stock  market  overall  assessment  is  that  the  average 
acquisition will result in a small but significantly negative effect on acquirer 
value.  This finding is consistent with other UK studies for the time period that 
also report significantly negative abnormal announcement returns to acquirers 
(e.g. Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). Share returns for acquiring firms over the 
long run post-acquisition period are also significantly negative for samples since 
1980. For example, Cosh et al. (2006) find that the 36-month post-acquisition 
mean return is -16.26 percent which is statistically significant. This result is 
consistent with other long run studies of UK acquirers over this sample time 
period such as Gregory (1997), and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003).
i Therefore, 
overall, the impact on the share price performance of acquiring firms is similar 
to earlier periods.  
 
The  impact  of  takeovers  on  profitability  since  the  1980s  is  somewhat  more 
positive than in earlier periods, although it depends very much on the specific 
profitability measure employed. Powell and Stark (2005) and Cosh et al. (2006) 
use  a  range  of  measures  and  find  consistent  results.  Specifically,  when 
comparing  post-  and  pre-takeover  performance,  measures  based  on  accrual 
profit  report  a  significantly  positive  increase  in  operating  performance.  The 
improvement ranges from 1.08 in the case of profit to book assets, to 1.65 in the 
case of profit to market value of assets. In contrast, when cash flow, rather than 
accrual, measures are used the impacts are positive, but smaller and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Therefore, there is some evidence that takeovers 
improve profitability, but this does not hold across all profitability measures.  
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To summarize, results post-1980 show that UK takeovers result in significant 
share  price  losses  over  both  the  short  and  long  run  period  surrounding  the 
acquisition. Acquiring shareholders are unambiguously worse off. The effect on 
operating performance ranges from mildly positive for the cash flow measures, 
to economically and statistically significantly positive for the accrual operating 
performance measures. There is therefore some evidence that the considerable 
changes in corporate governance described above have resulted in improved 
takeover performance in the aggregate.
ii The fact that this result is measurement 
specific suggests that caution should be exercised in placing too much weight 
on the accounting results. However, within the average effect it could be that 
those  firms  with  ‘effective’  governance  structures  do  better  for  their 
shareholders than those with less effective structures. In order to control for 
such  factors,  it  is  necessary  to  directly  examine  the  impact  of  the  specific 
corporate governance features on acquisition performance itself.  
 
Governance and Merger Performance Review 
 
There is a large UK empirical literature on the impact of firm specific corporate 
governance  mechanisms  on  both  overall  firm  performance  as  well  as  firm 
specific actions. However, despite the importance of acquisitions within firm 
strategy and the market for corporate control, only one published study to date 
in the UK has examined the impact of internal corporate governance measures 
on acquisition performance. Cosh et al. (2006) examine the impact of a wide 
range  of  corporate  governance  variables  on  takeover  performance.  They 
examine a sample of 363 domestic UK takeovers which occurred in the period 
1985-96, and assess performance in terms of announcement returns, long run 
share returns and a portfolio of accounting measures. In this section, we review 
the Cosh et al. (2006) findings, a summary of which is reported in Table 4. We 
also  review  the  literature  that  examines  the  impact  of  these  particular 
governance factors on firm performance in general.  
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Table 4 Summary of the Findings of Cosh et al. (2006) on the Impact of 
Corporate Governance Characteristics on UK Takeover Performance  
 







       
Board structure       
%non-executives  -  -  + 
Board size  -  +   + 
Chairman-CEO   -  -  + 
       
Impact of Cadbury       
Post-Cadbury  +  + *  + 
Chairman-CEO post-Cadbury  - *  +  - 
       
Ownership structure       
Board ownership (%)  +  + *  + 
Board ownership (%) squared  +  -  - 
CEO ownership (%)  -  + *  + * 
CEO ownership (%) squared  +  -  - 
Executive ownership (%)  +  +  + 
Executive ownership (%) squared  -  +  - 
Non-executive ownership (%)   -  -  + 
Non-executive ownership (%) 
squared  
+  +  + 
Largest institutional shareholder (%)  -  +  - 
Largest corporate shareholder (%)  +  +  - 
Largest personal shareholder (%)  -  +  - 
       
Incentive shares & relative pay       
CEO incentive shares (%)  -  +  + 
Executive incentive shares (%)  - *  - *  - 
Non-executive incentive shares (%)  +  +  - 
High CEO relative pay  +  -  + 
 
This table summarises the results from Cosh et al. (2006), who examine the impact of various firm specific 
governance characteristics on the performance of 363 domestic acquisitions made by UK public firms for UK 
public  firms  between  January  1985  and December  1996.  %non-executives  is  the number  of non-executive 
directors on the board divided by board size. Board size refers to the entire board of all executive and non-
executive directors. Chairman-CEO is a dummy variable that is set equal to one if the Chairman is also the 
CEO, zero otherwise. Post-Cadbury is a dummy variable that is set equal to one if the year of completion is 
1993 or afterwards, zero otherwise. Chairman-CEO post-Cadbury is a dummy variable that is set equal to 
Chairman-CEO if the acquisition year is 1993 or afterwards, zero otherwise. Board ownership (%) is the number 
of  beneficial  and  non-beneficial  shares  owned  by  the  entire  board,  divided  by  total  shares  in  issue.  CEO 
ownership (%) is the number of beneficial and non-beneficial shares owned by the CEO, divided by total shares   21 
in issue. Executive ownership (%) is the number of beneficial and non-beneficial shares owned by all executive 
directors except the CEO, divided by total shares in issue. Non-executive ownership (%) is the number of 
beneficial and non-beneficial shares owned by all non-executive directors, divided by total shares in issue. 
Largest institutional shareholder (%) is the largest external shareholding held by a financial institution. Largest 
corporate  shareholder  (%)  is  the  largest  external  shareholding  held  by  another  firm  that  is  not  a  financial 
institution. Largest personal shareholder (%) is the largest external shareholding held by a private individual. 
CEO incentive shares (%) is the number of incentive shares owned by the CEO, divided by the total number of 
shares  in  issue.  Executive  incentive  shares  (%)  is  the  number  of  incentive  shares  owned  by  all  executive 
directors except the CEO, divided by the total number of shares in issue. Non-executive incentive shares  (%) is 
the number of incentive shares owned by all non-executive directors, divided by the total number of shares in 
issue. High CEO relative pay is the highest paid director’s salary divided by the board total remuneration 
divided by board size. Pay refers to salary, plus pensions and bonuses. Announcement share returns are the 
mean cumulative abnormal share return for acquirers calculated from day -1 to day +1 (where day 0 is the 
announcement day), relative to the Market Index. Long run share returns are the mean buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns  for  acquirers  over  the  36-month  period  following  the  completion  month,  relative  to  control  firms. 
Profitability is the post-takeover abnormal profitability (median operating profitability of the acquirer in years 
+1 to +3 relative to control firms) regressed on pre-takeover profitability (median operating profitability of the 
weighted average acquirer and target in years -1 to -3 relative to control firms). Six measures of profitability are 
employed  (profit/total  assets,  profit/sales,  profit/market  value,  cash  flow/total  assets,  cash  flow/sales,  cash 
flow/market value), where profit is operating profit before depreciation, cash flow is operating profit before 
depreciation adjusted for short term accruals, and market value is the market value of equity and book value of 
long and short term debt. The profitability column here reflects the average impact on all six measures. Control 
firms, for both long run returns and profitability, are non-merging firms matched on industry and pre-acquisition 
profitability. The results for CEO ownership, executive ownership, non-executive ownership, and incentive 
shares,  are  for  a  reduced  sample  of  178  acquisitions  for  which  data  is  available.  *  indicates  statistical 
significance at the 10 percent level or higher. For the profitability measure, significance is measured according 
to the average t-statistic across the six profitability measures. 
 
 
The Impact of Cadbury 
 
We argued above that average takeover performance and acquiring company 
shareholder returns do not appear to differ in the period prior to and following 
the 1980s. Although pressure for corporate governance change can be traced to 
at least the early 1980s, formal corporate governance reforms could arguably be 
said to commence with the Cadbury Code in 1992. Since the sample takeovers 
in Cosh et al. (2006) straddle the Code, the authors include a dummy variable to 
reflect pre and post the implementation of the Cadbury Report. Table 4 shows 
that acquisitions carried out after Cadbury have more positive announcement 
and  long  run  returns,  significantly  so  for  the  latter.  In  terms  of  operating 
performance, this is more positive following Cadbury but not significantly so. 
Acquisitions are more profitable following Cadbury for four of the six operating 
performance  measures,  significantly  so  for  one  of  these  measures.  There  is 
therefore  some  evidence  that  takeover  performance  improves  following 
Cadbury.  
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Board Composition 
 
A small number of UK studies examine the impact of board composition on 
overall firm performance. The results provide little support for the hypothesis 
that a greater number, or proportion, of non-executive directors is associated 
with  enhanced  performance.  Vafeas  and  Theodorou  (1998),  using  a  cross 
section of 250 UK firms in 1994, find that the proportion of non-executives has 
an insignificant impact on Tobin’s Q. Weir and Laing (2000) examine 200 UK 
firms in both 1992 and 1995, finding that the number of non-executives has a 
negative  impact  on  profitability,  but  an  insignificant  impact  on  share  price 
performance. Weir et al. (2002) find that the proportion of non-executives has 
an insignificant effect on Tobin’s Q for 311 firms over 1994-96. These results 
are broadly consistent with the results for outside the UK.
iii In terms of firm 
specific decisions, there is evidence that a higher proportion of non-executives 
leads to less earnings manipulation (Peasnell et al., 2005), but little evidence it 
leads to more efficient decisions in terms of CEO dismissals (Cosh and Hughes, 
1997b; and Franks et al., 2001) or executive compensation (Cosh and Hughes, 
1997b). This is in contrast to the US, where there is stronger evidence that the 
proportion of outside directors is associated with better specific decisions such 
as  acquisitions,  executive  compensation  and  CEO  turnover  (Hermalin  and 
Weisbach, 2003). In terms of the impact on takeover performance, Cosh et al. 
(2006) find that the proportion of non-executives has an insignificantly negative 
impact on announcement and long run returns, and an insignificantly positive 
impact  on  five  of  their  six  operating  performance  measures.  Therefore  the 




A large number of empirical studies for the US have documented a negative 
association between board size and firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003).
iv In addition to these general performance effects, there is also evidence 
that smaller boards are more effective at specific decisions.
v The only UK study 
to date is Conyon and Peck (1998b). They examine 481 listed UK firms for 
1992-95 and find a significantly negative effect of board size on both market to 
book value and profitability. However, there is no evidence that the negative 
impact of board size extends to takeover performance. Cosh et al. (2006) find 
that board size has a statistically insignificant effect on takeover performance. 
Although the impact is negative for announcement returns, it is positive for long 
run returns and profitability.   23 
Separation of the CEO and Chairman 
 
There is a relatively small body of empirical research examining the impact of 
whether firms have a combined CEO-Chairman or not on performance. The 
evidence that does exist suggests that this factor has no significant impact on 
performance.  For the UK, studies such as Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), Weir 
and Laing (2000) and Weir et al. (2002) find little impact. Similar results hold 
elsewhere.
vi Cosh et al. (2006) find that when the chairman and CEO roles are 
combined, there is a negative impact on announcement and long run returns, yet 
a positive effect on five of the size operating performance measures, none of 
which are statistically significant. The authors hypothesize that any negative 
impact of the combined role will be weaker following Cadbury since the Code 
required a transparent and specific public justification where they continued to 
be combined. Therefore Cosh et al. (2006) interact the CEO-Chairman dummy 
variable  with  the  post-Cadbury  dummy.  As  Table  4  shows,  this  interactive 
variable is significantly negative for announcement share returns, but positive 
for long run returns and insignificantly negative for profitability effects. Thus in 
the long run, acquiring company shareholders may be better off as a result of 
this governance change. 
 
Board Ownership  
 
There is an extensive empirical literature on the impact of ownership structure 
on overall company performance. Until the mid 1980’s, the literature in this 
area  tested  for  differences  between  usually  dichotomous  groups  of  firms 
characterised as owner or manager controlled. Control status depended upon the 
proportion of shares owned by the board. Most such studies were concerned 
with  testing  specific  predictions  of  the  managerial  theory  of  the  firm  that 
manager-controlled firms would have higher growth rates but lower and more 
volatile profit rates or return on shares than owner controlled firms (Marris, 
1964). However, this particular trade off was rarely supported by the data. For 
the UK, Radice (1971) shows that significant board ownership is associated 
with superior shareholder performance whilst Holl (1975), using a much larger 
sample and controlling for market power, finds insignificant differences. The 
US results are equally mixed.
vii 
 
Later  studies  for  both  the  UK  and  the  USA  have  moved  away  from  the 
dichotomous approach as more refined ownership data has become available, 
and attention has switched to testing for entrenchment-based non-linear effects. 
Empirical studies attempting to identify the impact of these effects in the US 
and  UK  have  found  evidence  of  a  non-monotonic  relation  between  board   24 
ownership and company performance. For the USA, Morck et al. (1988) find 
that the value of Tobin's Q at first increases with board share ownership in the 
range 0 to 5 percent, decreases between 5 and 25 percent and then increases 
again above 25 percent. They argue that the entrenchment effect takes root once 
certain shareholding levels are reached and increases as shareholdings rise up to 
a further point beyond which no further entrenchment is necessary. Once the 
conditions necessary for entrenchment are reached, further ownership bestows 
no further entrenchment and no further adverse effects in terms of shareholder 
welfare. The convergence-of-interests effect it is argued, in contrast, operates 
throughout  the  whole  range  of  ownership.  Therefore  once  entrenchment  is 
reached, further ownership will result in an increase in company performance. 
McConnell and Servaes (1991 and 1995), and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), 
find an inverted U-shaped relationship that is consistent with entrenchment, but 
do not find a second turning point beyond which alignment effects reappear. 
The former, for instance, report positive effects between 0 and 40-50 percent 
and negative effects thereafter with no subsequent upturn. Kole (1995) argues 
that the difference between the first turning point in these results and those of 
Morck  et  al.  (1988)  may  be  due  to  the  exclusion  of  small  companies  from 
Morck et al.’s sample. The inclusion of large numbers of smaller companies, 
she  contends,  raises  the  point  up  to  which  the  positive  effects  of  alignment 
persist because ‘the positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and managerial 
ownership is sustained at higher levels of ownership for small firms than it is 
for large firms’ (Kole, 1995, p. 426).   
 
For  the  UK,  Cubbin  and  Leech  (1986)  develop  a  continuous  variable  of 
shareholder  power  based  on  the  size  and  location  of  shareholdings  and  the 
dispersion of remaining shares. In a sample of 43 large companies in the early 
1970’s they find no evidence of significant performance effects arising from 
board  shareholder  power.  However,  Short  and  Keasey  (1999)  use  a  random 
sample of 221 large UK companies for the period 1988-1992 and report similar 
results to Morck et al. (1988) linking board ownership to performance. They 
report  higher  turning  points  at  around  12-15  percent  and  then  41  percent 
depending on the performance measure used. Although these are similar to the 
turning points in some of the other US studies they interpret this as showing that 
board entrenchment becomes effective at higher levels of ownership in the UK 
compared to the US and that the entrenchment effect dominates up to much 
higher share ownership levels. Faccio and Lasfer (1999) analyse a much larger 
UK  sample  of  all  UK  non-financial  listed  companies  in  1996  and  find  no 
relationship between firm value and board ownership in general, although they 
report that a non-linear relationship with two turning points exists for the sub-
set  of  firms  with  high  growth  prospects  (proxied  by  high  P/E  ratios).  They   25 
speculate that their general lack of robust findings of any entrenchment effects 
of board ownership on firm value performance may reflect the effectiveness of 
external governance pressures in the UK.  Finally, Weir et al., (2002) analyse 
311  companies  from  the  1996  Times1000  list,  and  find  evidence  for  an 
entrenchment effect in terms an inverted U shaped relationship between Tobin’s 




Cosh et al. (2006), in keeping with the existing literature on entrenchment and 
alignment,  test  the  hypothesis  that  there  will  be  a  significant  but  non-linear 
relationship  between  board  ownership  and  takeover  performance.  They 
experiment with various functional forms. They find no evidence of a relation 
between  board  ownership  and  announcement  period  share  returns,  strong 
evidence of a positive linear relation between board ownership and long run 
share returns, and weak evidence of a positive linear relation between board 
ownership  and  operating  performance.  They  find  no  evidence  of  negative 
entrenchment effects although they do find that the effect of board ownership is 
more acute at low (less than five percent) levels of holdings, and some evidence 
of diminishing effects at higher levels of ownership. 
 
The scope for entrenchment and the exercise of discretionary power to pursue 
non-shareholder welfare strategies may be imperfectly measured by focussing 
on board ownership in aggregate and by focussing on board ownership alone. 
Aggregate  board  ownership  is  one  component  of  the  anatomy  of  corporate 
control and should be disaggregated and located in a wider range of factors 
which will condition its impact (Cosh and Hughes, 1987 and 1997a; Deakin and 
Hughes,  1997;  Vafeas,  1999;  and  Weir  et  al.,  2002).  Where  a  substantial 
aggregate board holding is made up of several smaller holdings, entrenchment 
requires coordination of action and a clear community of interests between the 
holders. This may weaken the power of the entrenchment effect, and at the same 
time strengthen the incentive effect because ownership is dispersed across more 
board members. Conversely, where board ownership in aggregate is dominated 
by one, or a few, large holdings the entrenchment effect will be more likely to 
emerge and the incentive effect will be more muted because fewer directors are 
involved.  
 
Stronger  entrenchment  effects  for  CEO  and  executive  shareholdings  are 
predicted  than  for  board  ownership  as  a  whole  and  for  non-executive 
shareholdings.  In  a  US  study  focussing  on  CEO  ownership,  Griffith  (1999) 
reports results similar to Morck et al. (1988) in having two turning points. He 
shows that Tobin’s Q rises with CEO ownership between 0 and 15 percent,   26 
declines for values between 15 and 50 percent, and rises again when the CEO 
has  over  50  percent  of  the  stock.  For  the  UK,  Weir  et  al.  (2002)  find  that 
Tobin’s  Q  initially  rises  with  CEO  ownership  and  then  declines.    It  is  also 
important  to  distinguish  between  non-executive  and  executive  directors 
shareholdings. The former, in principle, play a key role in monitoring executive 
directors and are expected to have objectives aligned with shareholder interests. 
We  would  therefore  expect  entrenchment  effects  based  on  ownership  to  be 
weaker for this group compared to executive shareholdings.  
 
Cosh et al. (2006) also take a disaggregated view of board shareholdings paying 
particular attention to the composition of board shareholdings as well as their 
size. They analyse the separate impact of CEO shareholdings and the pattern of 
non-executive and executive holdings within the board. Much stronger effects 
are found when the overall board measure is split into CEO, executive, and non-
executive directors. They find strong evidence of a positive relation between 
CEO ownership and both the long run return and operating performance impact 
of takeover on acquiring firms. The positive effect declines as CEO ownership 
increases to high levels of about 20 percent. These findings are consistent with 
the  existence  of  discretion  to  pursue  non-shareholder  welfare  maximisation 
takeovers, and with an incentive impact of CEO shareholdings that prevents it 
from occurring when substantial CEO holdings are present. This ‘corrective’ 
power appears to be subject to diminishing returns. It is not however subverted 
by  potential  entrenchment  effects  at  higher  CEO  shareholding  levels.  In 
contrast,  shareholdings  of  other  executive  directors,  non-executive  directors, 
and  non-board  holdings  are  found  to  have  no  significant  effect  on  takeover 
performance.  
 
The  intra-board  emphasis  is  in  keeping  with  a  more  general  interest  in  the 
governance and agency literature, of conflicts of interest within corporate elites 
and the potential role of CEO power and hubris in driving corporate strategic 
decision  taking  (Allen  1981;  Baysinger  and  Hoskisson,  1990;  Hayward  and 
Hambrick, 1997; and Jensen and Zajac, 2004). Cosh et al. (2006) investigate the 
impact that CEO dominance may have in affecting takeover outcomes where 
dominance is proxied by the ratio of CEO to other directors’ remuneration. The 
authors predict a negative relationship between takeover performance and the 
ratio of CEO to average board pay. However, the coefficient for the CEO pay 
over average pay measure is of indeterminate sign and statistically insignificant. 
This is consistent with corporate governance restrictions on CEO discretion. 
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As noted above, incentive shares increased dramatically in the bull markets of 
the  1990s  and  potentially  increase  the  incentive  alignment  effects  of  share 
ownership  since  in  principle  the  shares  should  yield  gains  conditional  on 
meeting specified shareholder welfare creating activities. The extent to which 
this is the case clearly depends upon the design of the contracts and the extent to 
which  executives  can  manipulate  them  in  their  favour.  Cosh  et  al.  (2006) 
consider the impact of incentive shares on takeover performance, by examining 
the number of incentive shares as a proportion of number of shares in issue. The 
hypothesis is that takeover performance will be enhanced in the presence of 
CEO, executive and non-executive incentive shares. They find that neither CEO 
nor  non-executive  director  incentive  shares  have  a  consistent  or  significant 
effect on takeover performance. However, they do find that executive director 
incentive shares have a consistently negative impact, significantly so in the case 
of  announcement  returns,  long  returns,  and  for  two  of  the  six  operating 





As  noted  above,  takeover  performance  is  hypothesised  to  be  more  closely 
aligned  with  shareholder  interests  where  substantial  off-board  holdings  by 
financial institutions exist. Filatotchev et al., (2007) review the literature on 
large  external  shareholders  and  overall  firm  performance  and  conclude  that 
there is no robust link between more concentrated external holdings and better 
firm  performance.  The  only  previous  UK  study  examining  the  impact  of 
financial  institutions  on  merger  performance  is  Cosh  et  al.  (1989).  They 
examine  two  U.K.  merger  samples.  In  the  first  sample  drawn  from  the  low 
merger period 1981–1983, pre- and post-merger differences are found between 
merging  companies  with,  and  without  a  significant  institutional  presence. 
However, in the takeover boom year of 1986, from which the second sample is 
drawn, all such distinctions become blurred. Cosh et al. (2006) also assess the 
impact  of  non-board  holdings  by  financial  institutions,  as  well  as  by 
corporations  and  persons.  The  effect  of  these  external  shareholders  is 
indeterminate  and  rarely  significant.  For  example,  the  largest  institutional 
shareholder has an insignificantly positive impact on announcement and long 
run returns, yet a negative impact for three (significantly so in one case) of the 
operating performance measures, and a positive impact for the other three of 
these measures.  
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Summary 
 
Our  review  of  the  literature  on  the  relationship  between  internal  corporate 
governance  mechanisms  and  the  performance  of  UK  companies  in  both  a 
general sense and in terms of takeover performance shows that there is a weak 
relationship  between  internal  governance  mechanisms  and  performance.  The 
exception  is  board  and  more  specifically  CEO  ownership.  Acquirers  whose 
CEOs own a larger proportion of equity, consequently carry out acquisitions 
which  perform  significantly  better  in  terms  of  both  long  run  returns  and 
operating performance, and these impacts are stronger at lower levels of board 
ownership  reflecting  diminishing  returns  to  alignment  at  higher  ownership 
levels. There is no evidence of entrenchment effects within the levels of board 
ownership examined. Furthermore, acquisition performance is not only better, 
but  significantly  positive  for  such  acquirers.  This  key  finding  on  CEO 
ownership  in  the  context  of  acquisitions  is  robust  to  a  number  of  potential 
biases. Firstly, a potentially serious problem with many corporate governance 
studies is that of reverse causality, whereby governance changes because of past 
or  expected  performance,  not  the  other  way  round.  One  possibility  in  the 
context of acquisitions is that at low levels of ownership, CEOs purchase stock 
in anticipation of good takeover performance. Cosh et al. (2006) carry out two-
stage least squares regressions but find that this approach yields results that are 
very similar. They therefore conclude that the positive effect of CEO ownership 
on takeover performance is the result of higher CEO shareholdings leading to 
improved takeover performance rather than CEOs buying shares in anticipation 
of good takeover performance.  The finding is also robust to controlling for 
other  factors  that  determine  takeover  performance  (acquirer  performance, 
relative size, means of payment, hostility, industrial direction) and a variety of 
other  constraints  which  may  influence  director  behaviour  arising  from  debt 
related  lender  power  and  the  product  market.  The  fact  that  CEO  ownership 
leads to higher acquisition performance potentially has important implications 
for the effect of acquisitions involving private equity firms. In particular, given 
that such acquisitions frequently result in CEOs taking a large ownership stake, 
they may ceteris paribus, perform better than other types of acquisition.  
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Conclusion 
 
We have shown that waves of takeover activity have occurred with increasing 
intensity in recent decades in the UK, unabated by the significant changes to 
share ownership and corporate governance. Initially, the poor average outcomes 
for shareholders of these bouts of takeover activity could be argued to follow 
from  the  separation  of  ownership  from  control,  the  lack  of  alignment  of 
management with shareholder interests, and the inability of boards of directors 
to  monitor  and  control  the  strategies  of  their  management  teams.  We  have 
shown the massive structural changes in each of these features over the last 
forty years and yet, takeover performance for the acquiring shareholders shows 
little sign of improving and positive profitability performance effects depend 
upon the choice of particular performance measures. In addition, the specific 
changes to board structures and executive pay cannot be shown to have had 
much impact on takeover outcomes. It still appears to be the case that, as Dennis 
Mueller argued in 1969, the directors of large corporations invest in acquisitions 
beyond the point at which the welfare of their shareholders will be maximised. 
It may be the case that both management and shareholder representatives are 
overly optimistic about the gains they can make from acquisitions and about the 
premiums they can afford to pay. We have pointed out above that it is possible 
that  private  equity  firms  bring  a  new  type  of  player  on  to  the  market  for 
corporate control, one for whom the rewards for effective takeovers are greater 
and  more  direct.  It  would  be  ironic  if  this  turned  out  to  be  the  means  for 
improved takeover performance given the conglomerate nature of private equity 
acquisitions and their rather poor record on corporate governance.   30 
Notes
 
i It is important to note that studies which examine the impact of acquisitions of 
private targets (e.g., Conn et al., 2005) do not find evidence of negative returns. 
Earlier studies (i.e., pre-1980) do not examine this type of acquisition. 
ii Despite the overall performance of acquisitions over the period, Guest (2007a) 
shows  that  acquisitions  on  average  have  a  significantly  positive  impact  on 
executive pay. Therefore acquiring firm directors benefit in terms of higher pay, 
even if their shareholders do not.  
iii  For  the  US,  most  studies  (e.g.,  Hermalin  and  Weisbach,  1991;  Yermack, 
1996; Dalton et al., 1998; and Klein, 1998) find no association, whilst a smaller 
number (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2002; and Coles 
et al., 2007) find a negative relation. Outside the US, Hossain et al. (2001) and 
Choi  et  al.  (2007)  find  a  positive  relation  for  New  Zealand  and  Korea 
respectively, Beiner et al. (2004; 2006), and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find no 
relation for Swiss and Malaysian firms respectively, whilst Bozec (2005) finds a 
negative relation for Canadian firms.  
iv For the US, see Yermack (1996), Huther (1997), and Coles et al. (2007). 
Evidence from other countries is broadly consistent but less robust. Eisenberg et 
al. (1998) provide similar evidence for small private firms in Finland, whilst 
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) do so for Malaysian 
firms.  For  Belgium,  Dehaene  et  al.  (2001)  find  that  board  size  has  an 
insignificantly negative impact on profitability. For Switzerland, Loderer and 
Peyer (2002) find a significantly negative impact on Tobin’s Q (although not on 
profitability)  whilst  Beiner  et  al.  (2004  and  2006)  find  no  negative  impact. 
Bozec  (2005)  finds  a  significantly  negative  effect  on  sales  margin  but  not 
profitability for Canadian firms.  
v For example, Yermack (1996) finds that firms with smaller boards have a 
stronger relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover, and higher 
sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to stock returns. 
vi  See  e.g.,  Daily  and  Dalton  (1992;  1994),  Beatty  and  Zajac  (1994),  Boyd 
(1994), and Ocasio (1994). In their meta-analysis of 31 studies of links between 
separation and financial performance, Dalton et al. (1998) do not establish any 
significant causal relationship. 
vii Profit and share price performance differences alone proved equally elusive, 
although studies which corrected returns for risk, controlled for market power 
constraints and allowed for some disaggregation between board and non-board 
holdings  produced  more  robust  results.  For  the  USA,  Kamerschen  (1968), 
Larner  (1970),  Sorensen  (1974),  Qualls  (1976),  Kania  and  McKean  (1976), 
Zeitlin and Norich (1979), and Herman (1981) find insignificant shareholder 
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performance differences between high board shareholder (owner controlled) and 
low board shareholder (manager controlled) groups. In contrast, Monsen et al. 
(1968), Boudreaux (1973), Palmer (1973 and 1975), Stano (1975 and 1976), 
McEachern (1975 and 1978) do find superior shareholder welfare performance. 
Palmer (1973 and 1975), in particular, shows the importance of market power in 
allowing managerial discretion and performance differences to emerge.  
viii A number of studies have related ownership characteristics not to overall 
performance, but to specific observable firm actions. These include US papers 
analysing the impact of board ownership on the premiums paid in takeover bids, 
the method of takeover payment and post-acquisition executive job retention 
(Martin, 1996; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; and Ghosh and Ruland, 1998), 
executive pay around acquisitions (Wright et al., 2002), and the likelihood of 
paying  greenmail  or  excessive  bid  premia  (Kosnik,  1987  and  1990).  These 
studies provide mixed evidence in identifying significant ownership impacts. 
For the UK, Guest (2007a) finds that ownership structure has no impact on 
executive pay awards following acquisition. 
ix There are also some direct estimates of the impact of board ownership on 
takeover performance outcomes for the acquiring company shareholders. These 
have  focussed  on  announcement  effects,  and  relate  only  to  the  USA.  Conn 
(1980) using a dichotomous approach finds no differences in merger pricing or 
share returns between owner and manager controlled groups. However, Slutsky 
and  Caves  (1991)  show  that  as  acquiring  board  holdings  increase,  a  lower 
premium  is  paid  for  the  target.  Lewellen  et  al.  (1985),  Loderer  and  Martin, 
(1998), and Shinn (1999) using a more continuous approach report a positive 
linear relationship between board ownership and announcement returns. These 
latter  three  studies  suggest  that  the  detrimental  effects  of  entrenched 
management observed with company performance in general do not apply in the 
case  of  corporate  takeovers.  Hubbard  and  Palia,  (1995)  however  provide 
evidence of a U shaped relationship. They argue that at sufficiently high levels 
of  managerial  ownership,  managers  hold  a  large  non-diversified  financial 
portfolio in the firm. Such management will pay a premium for risk reducing 
acquisitions, even if the value of the acquiring firm decreases. 
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